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Abstract
Prior research has indicated that disease threat and disgust are associated with harsher moral condemnation. We investigated the
role of a specific, highly salient health concern, namely the spread of the coronavirus, and associated COVID-19 disease, on moral
disapproval. We hypothesized that individuals who report greater subjective worry about COVID-19 would be more sensitive to
moral transgressions. Across three studies (N ¼ 913), conducted March-May 2020 as the pandemic started to unfold in the
United States, we found that individuals who were worried about contracting the infectious disease made harsher moral judg-
ments than those who were relatively less worried. This effect was not restricted to transgressions involving purity, but extended
to transgressions involving harm, fairness, authority, and loyalty, and remained when controlling for political orientation.
Furthermore, for Studies 1 and 2 the effect also was robust when taking into account the contamination subscale of the Disgust
Scale–Revised. These findings add to the growing literature that concrete threats to health can play a role in abstract moral
considerations, supporting the notion that judgments of wrongdoing are not based on rational thought alone.
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People’s moral compass is typically assumed to be firmly
grounded in rational thought. For example, legal systems rely
on judges and jurors making decisions about wrongdoing via
detached evaluation of the available evidence. However, an
emerging literature suggests that judging right or wrong can
be colored by factors that are objectively unrelated to deliberate
considerations, such as emotions and intuitions. Haidt (2001)
proposed that such factors are the driving force behind moral
judgments, with rationalizations taking place only after a deci-
sion has already been reached. Indeed, there is an increasing
recognition that morality is shaped by processes that unfold
largely outside of conscious awareness.
In particular, disgust has been suggested to play a role in the
evaluation of moral transgressions due to its evolutionary func-
tion of disease avoidance (Rozin et al., 2008; Schnall et al.,
2008; Tybur et al., 2013). Indeed, pathogens and parasites have
played an outsized role in evolutionary history. For both
hunter-foraging societies and our nearest evolutionary rela-
tives, chimpanzees, about seven out of every 10 deaths can
be attributed to infections (Finch, 2010, 2012). Even in armed
conflict, illness has historically accounted for far more deaths
than those that result from combat itself. For example, in the
American civil war, two-thirds of the estimated 660,000 deaths
were caused by pneumonia, typhoid, dysentery, and malaria
(Connolly & Heymann, 2002). Furthermore, during famines,
infectious diseases have caused more deaths than starvation as
a consequence of the behavioral changes induced by conditions
of extreme hunger (Shaw-Taylor, 2020). Even in modern times,
nearly a quarter of all worldwide deaths have been due to
infectious diseases—more than double that from violence or
injury (WHO, 2015).
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In light of the substantial risks posed by infectious illnesses,
there has been a large body of literature investigating the asso-
ciations between disease threat, behavioral caution, lower tol-
erance for nonconformity, and political conservatism
(Mortensen et al., 2010; Murray & Schaller, 2012; Wu &
Chang, 2012; Zmigrod et al., 2020). Such associations are
thought to reflect the potency of disease threat, such that infec-
tious disease concerns motivate individuals to more closely
behave in line with societal expectations.
Likewise, disease threat appears to be associated with moral
vigilance (Murray et al., 2019; Park & Isherwood, 2011; Van
Leeuwen et al., 2012). Results from this line of research are
consistent with the conceptual link between disgust and moral
considerations, as disgust is thought to have evolved primarily to
facilitate disease avoidance. Historically, individuals believed
that violating moral proscriptions increased the likelihood of
danger, and in particular the spread of infectious disease
(Fabrega, 1997). Therefore, wrongdoers who violated such
norms posed a threat to the survival of others. Under perilous
conditions, such as during a pandemic, such norms may take on
even more importance, especially to the extent that individuals
subjectively evaluate the infectious disease as threatening.
Indeed, Murray et al. (2019) found a positive association
between sensitivity to moral wrongdoing and the germ aversion
subscale of the Perceived Vulnerability to Disease scale.
Another way of approaching this issue is to examine natu-
rally occurring concerns about physical contamination, such as
the fear of contracting a highly salient contagious disease that
poses an immediate threat. In other words, to explore the rela-
tionship between disease threat and morality, one can examine
the relationship between concern about physical health and
moral judgments directly. In early 2020, the global spread of
a previously unknown type of coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2)
leading to COVID-19 disease presented such an opportunity.
In March-May 2020 we assessed whether U.S. participants’
fear about catching the disease was related to their moral judg-
ments. We did so by asking a standard polling question about
coronavirus worry, and administering a set of survey items that
encompassed different domains of morality. Moral Founda-
tions Theory (Graham et al., 2009) proposes at least five moral
foundations: Aversion for the suffering of others (Harm), con-
cern with cheating and lack of reciprocity (Fairness), group
adherence (Loyalty), deference to leadership and tradition
(Authority), and concern with purity and contamination (Pur-
ity). These five foundations are thought to have arisen to cope
with adaptive challenges in human ancestral environments. We
hypothesized that individuals who report subjective worry
about contracting COVID-19 would express more disapproval
when evaluating wrongdoing than individuals with relatively
lower worry.
Study 1
The first study was conducted on March 17, 2020, days after
COVID-19 was declared a pandemic by the World Health
Organization (March 11, 2020), and a national emergency by
the U.S. government (March 13, 2020). Occurrence was largely
concentrated in Washington state, with 904 cases, including 48
deaths. We therefore sampled participants from this state, and
as a comparison, Maine, a less densely populated state with
only 17 cases and no deaths at that time. We reasoned that fear
of the virus would be higher in the former than the latter state.
In addition, to make the health threat salient, half the partici-
pants read a New York Times article on the dangers of the
pandemic while the other half read a neutral article about
national parks. We predicted harsher moral judgments for par-
ticipants who were worried about catching the virus, compared
to those who were not.
Method
Participants
Participants from Washington and Maine were recruited via the
online participant panel Prolific. Because it was the first study,
we did not have a specific effect size in mind, and aimed for a
target sample of 200, collecting data from 220 participants in
anticipation of possible exclusions. We removed data from 14
participants for failing attention checks. The final sample con-
sisted of 206 participants (130 women; age: M ¼ 36.80 years,
SD ¼ 14.16), with 165 from Washington, and 41 from Maine.1
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants were randomly
assigned to read one of two New York Times articles, either on
the dangers of coronavirus infections, or about national parks,
both published on March 13, 2020. They then responded to
60 Moral Foundations Vignettes that had been pre-tested and
standardized (Clifford et al., 2015). There were 12 violations
for each foundation, rated on a scale from 1 (not at all wrong) to
5 (extremely wrong). Scenarios included, “You see a girl
laughing when she realizes her friend’s dad is the janitor”
(Harm), “You see a tenant bribing a landlord to be the first
to get their apartment repainted” (Fairness), “You see a man
leaving his family business to go work for their main
competitor” (Loyalty), “You see a star player ignoring her
coach’s order to come to the bench during a game” (Author-
ity), and “You see two first cousins getting married to each
other in an elaborate wedding” (Purity). Vignettes were admi-
nistered in a randomized order.
Then participants indicated their worry about COVID-19
by responding to a standardized question taken from the pop-
ular public opinion and data company YouGov: “Taking into
consideration both your risk of contracting it and the serious-
ness of the illness, how worried are you personally about
experiencing coronavirus?” Response options included “not
at all worried,” “not too worried,” “somewhat worried” and
“very worried.” Participants then completed the Disgust
Sensitivity Scale-Revised (Haidt et al., 1994, modified by
Olatunji et al. (2007)) to assess whether the contribution of
coronavirus worry went above and beyond this individual
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difference variable. Lastly participants provided demo-
graphics and their political orientation, rated on a scale from




Using a 2  2 ANOVA we first tested whether COVID-19
case prevalence as a function of state (Washington vs.
Maine) and Virus Threat Salience (Coronavirus vs. National
Parks article) were associated with different levels of worry
about contracting the illness. Unexpectedly, there was no
effect of State, F(1, 202) ¼ .74, p ¼ .39, nor of Threat
Salience, F(1, 202) ¼ .81, p ¼ .37, and no interaction,
F(1, 202) ¼ .03, p ¼ .87, indicating that for people’s con-
cern about the virus it did not matter as a function of
whether they resided in an area with high vs. low disease
prevalence, nor whether they had been primed with infor-
mation about the virus, or not. We therefore were unable to
analyze moral judgments based on these variables, and
instead performed exploratory analyses using participants’
self-reported level of coronavirus concern.
Moral Judgment
Following standard practice in opinion polls from which we
derived the survey item (YouGov), we divided the sample into
participants who were less worried (i.e., indicated they were
“not at all worried” or “not too worried,” n ¼ 72), and those
who were more worried (i.e., indicated they were “somewhat
worried” or “very worried,” n ¼ 134). Furthermore, because
the study was administered less than 1 week after COVID-19
was declared a national emergency in the U.S., and most parti-
cipants reported at least some level of worry about COVID-19,
we dichotomized the variable into “less worried” and
“worried.” Dichotomizing continuous variables can be a useful
approach for analyzing non-normal data (Farringdon & Loeber,
2000). Indeed, a Shapiro-Wilk test showed a significant depar-
ture from normality, W(206) ¼ .84, p < .001. For each parti-
cipant, the mean moral disapproval rating across the five
foundations was calculated, with higher scores indicating more
severe condemnation.
We then performed a repeated-measures ANOVA with
Moral Foundation (Harm, Fairness, Authority, Loyalty, and
Purity) as a within-subjects factor and Worry (Worried vs.
Less-Worried) as a between-subjects factor. The Huynh-Feldt
correction was applied because Mauchly’s test of sphericity
was significant (p < .001). There was a main effect of moral
foundation, F(3.47, 707.45) ¼ 123.43, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ 0.38,
with the highest ratings for purity (M ¼ 3.61, 95% CI ¼ [3.52,
3.70]) and fairness violations (M ¼ 3.48, 95% CI ¼ [3.40,
3.55]), followed by harm (M ¼ 3.45, 95% CI ¼ [3.36, 3.53]),
authority (M¼ 3.17, 95% CI¼ [3.08, 3.26]), and loyalty viola-
tions (M ¼ 2.78, 95% CI ¼ [2.68, 2.89]).
Testing the key prediction, worried participants (M ¼ 3.42,
SD¼ .51) produced harsher moral judgments than less-worried
participants (M¼ 3.18, SD¼ .51), F(1, 204)¼ 10.66, p¼ .001,
Zp
2 ¼ .05 (see Figure 1 for means). Foundation Type did not
interact with Worry, F(3.55, 724.70) ¼ .49, p ¼ .722, suggest-
ing that the effect was comparable across foundations.
Figure 1. Ratings of moral condemnation for individuals who were worried, or relatively less worried about coronavirus, Study 1.
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Political Orientation
Because prior research has shown that political orientation
correlates with moral judgments (e.g., Graham et al., 2009),
we also conducted an ANCOVA for which we added responses
to this item as a covariate to the analysis above. Consistent with
earlier research, political orientation was a significant predictor
of moral condemnation, F(1, 203) ¼ 15.63, p < .001. More
importantly, however, when controlling for it, the effect
of coronavirus worry remained robust, F(1, 203) ¼ 14.97,
p < .001, Zp
2 ¼ .069. Thus, the observed difference was not
driven by political ideology.
Contamination Disgust
Across participants, scores on the contamination subscale of
the Disgust Scale–Revised (DS-R, Haidt et al., 1994, modified
by Olatunji et al., 2007) was associated with COVID-19 worry
(r ¼ .20, p < .001). To investigate the possible effects of con-
tamination disgust on moral judgment between the two groups,
a repeated-measures ANCOVA was performed with contami-
nation disgust as a covariate. There was an effect for this cov-
ariate, F(1, 203) ¼ 22.10, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .10. More
importantly, however, the main effect of coronavirus worry
remained significant after controlling for contamination dis-
gust, F(1, 203) ¼ 6.28, p ¼ .013, Zp2 ¼ .03.
Discussion
Study 1 provided initial evidence that the extent to which peo-
ple were worried about coronavirus in the early days of the
2020 COVID-19 pandemic related to condemnation of moral
transgressions that were unrelated to the virus: Participants
who were worried about COVID-19 produced harsher moral
judgments than those who were less worried. Importantly, this
effect could not be attributed to political orientation, consistent
with earlier findings that the role of disgust in moral judgment
is not explained by ideology (van Leeuven et al., 2017). We
furthermore controlled for contamination disgust, and although
it accounted for some of the variance, the association between
worry and moral judgment remained robust.
However, we had included a threat salience manipulation at
the beginning of the study, which turned out to be ineffective,
and considered it important to replicate the effect without such
a procedure before participants made the moral judgments. We
therefore conducted another study, and as additional improve-
ment also counterbalanced the order in which the moral judg-
ments and the coronavirus worry question were administered.
Study 2
The second data collection was carried out 10 days later, on
March 27, 2020, when COVID-19 cases across the U.S. had
risen somewhat but were still relatively localized, with 3,700
cases in Washington state, including 174 deaths, but only 168
cases and one death in Maine, respectively. We again focused
on these two states as representing objectively different virus
threats, in case this was important for subjectively experienced
worry about the virus.
Method
Participants
We recruited participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk from
Washington and Maine. Building on the observed effect size
from Study 1, d ¼ .47, a G*Power analysis (Faul et al., 2007)
indicated a required sample size of 238 for an independent
samples t-test (two-tailed) with 95% power at a ¼ .05. We
removed data from 11 participants because they did not com-
plete the study, and from seven participants for failing attention
checks. The final sample consisted of 220 participants (126
women; age: M ¼ 39.11 years, SD ¼ 12.69), with 189 from
Washington, and 44 from Maine.
Procedure
Identical materials, measures and procedure as in Study 1 were
used, but there was no coronavirus manipulation at the begin-
ning, and administration of the moral stimuli and the corona-
virus worry question was counterbalanced.
Results
Manipulation Check
We first conducted a one-way ANOVA to test whether coro-
navirus worry differed between residents of Washington and
Maine. Consistent with the results from Study 1, there was no
effect, F(1, 218) ¼ .002, p ¼ .97. We therefore used the same
analysis strategy and focused on participants’ self-reported
level of coronavirus concern (i.e., their subjectively experi-
enced threat).
Moral Judgment
We performed a repeated-measures ANOVA with Moral Foun-
dations (Harm, Fairness, Authority, Loyalty, and Purity) as a
within-subjects factor and Worry (Worried vs. Less-Worried)
and Order (Worry Question first vs. Moral Judgments first) as
between-subjects factors. The Huynh-Feldt correction was used
because Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant (p ¼ .001).
Results revealed no main effects of order F(1,216) ¼ 0.12,
p ¼ .725, nor any Order  Group interaction, F(1, 216) ¼
0.22, p ¼ .637. Therefore, order was not further considered.
There was a main effect of moral foundation, F(3.48,
757.52)¼ 75.602, p < .001, Zp2¼ 0.26, with the highest ratings
for purity violations (M ¼ 3.65, 95% CI ¼ [3.55, 3.75]), then
fairness (M ¼ 3.46, 95% CI ¼ [3.38, 3.55]), followed by harm
(M ¼ 3.29, 95% CI ¼ [3.19, 3.39]), authority (M ¼ 3.20, 95%
CI¼ [3.09, 3.31]), and loyalty violations (M¼ 2.92, 95% CI¼
[2.80, 3.05]). Replicating the results of Study 1, there was a
main effect of worry, such that worried participants (M ¼ 3.43,
SD ¼ .58) showed greater moral condemnation than less-
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worried participants (M ¼ 3.18, SD ¼ .60), F(1, 218) ¼ 8.67, p
¼ .004, Zp2 ¼ .04 (see Figure 2). There was no foundation 
worry interaction, F(3.48, 757.52) ¼ .52, p ¼ .694, again indi-
cating that the effect was not limited to any specific founda-
tions, such as purity.
Political Orientation
To rule out this possible confound, the same analysis as above
was conducted with political orientation as a covariate. Con-
sistent with earlier research, political orientation was a signif-
icant predictor of moral condemnation, F(1, 217) ¼ 29.64, p <
.001. As was the case for Study 1, there still was a significant
difference between the worried and less-worried participants
for moral disapproval, F(1, 217)¼ 13.47, p < .001, Zp2¼ .058,
again showing the independent contribution of disease concern.
Contamination Disgust
Consistent with Study 1, contamination disgust was associated
with COVID-19 worry (r¼ .20, p¼ .003). To again investigate
the possible effects of contamination disgust on moral judg-
ment between the two groups, a repeated-measures ANCOVA
was performed with scores on the contamination subscale of
the Disgust Scale-Revised (Olatunji et al., 2007) as a covariate.
Contamination disgust showed a significant effect regarding
moral condemnation, F(1, 217) ¼ 54.10, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .20.
Importantly, and replicating the results from Study 1, the effect
of coronavirus worry on moral judgment remained significant
after controlling for contamination disgust, F(1, 217) ¼ 4.22,
p ¼ .041, Zp2 ¼ .02.
Discussion
This study replicated the observation that a situational threat to
one’s physical health, namely concern about contracting an
illness that was spreading rapidly throughout the U.S. at the
time, was related to moral concerns. Speaking to ongoing
debates of whether the link between disgust and morality is
domain-specific, or more general (see Schnall, 2017, for a
discussion), in both studies the effect was not specific to trans-
gressions involving purity, but extended to all moral
foundations.
Study 3
Both studies 1 and 2 included samples from only two areas of
the U.S. that had varying levels of cases of COVID-19. Parti-
cipants in these states did not differ in subjectively perceived
worry about the virus, thus justifying the use of the latter as the
predictor variable. These findings still raise the question, how-
ever, of whether the same effect would be observed more
broadly across the population. In particular, while in mid-to-
late March 2020, when the first two studies were conducted,
COVID-19 cases were relatively low in the U.S., it was also
important to explore whether the effects would persist as the
pandemic unfolded across the country. We therefore conducted
a preregistered replication about 6 weeks after Study 2, sam-
pling across the entire U.S. On May 6, 2020, when the study
was conducted, there were 1,261,354 COVID-19 cases, includ-
ing 74,710 deaths. We again predicted that people worried
about the virus would rate moral infractions as more objection-
able than those who were less worried.
Figure 2. Ratings of moral condemnation for individuals who were worried, or relatively less worried about coronavirus, Study 2.
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Method
Participants
Participants were recruited across the U.S. with Prolific. Using
the effect size from Study 2, d¼ .42, a G*Power analysis using
95% power at a ¼ .05 specified a required sample of 296
participants. However, because the earlier studies were con-
ducted only in Maine and Washington, to account for increased
variability when sampling across the entire population of the
U.S., we set our preregistered sample to 500. Data from 13
participants were excluded because they failed attention
checks. The final sample involved 487 participants (273
women; age: M ¼ 31.25, SD ¼ 11.77).
Procedure
The method was identical to Study 2.
Results
We performed a repeated-measures ANOVA with Moral Foun-
dations (Harm, Fairness, Authority, Loyalty, and Purity) as a
within-subjects factor and Worry (Worried vs. Less-Worried)
and Order (coronavirus question first or moral foundations
vignettes first) as between-subjects factors. The Huynh-Feldt
correction was used as Mauchly’s test of sphericity was signif-
icant (p < .001). Results revealed no main effects of Order
F(1,483) ¼ 0.85, p ¼ .356, and no Order  Group interaction,
F(1, 483) ¼ 1.79, p ¼ .182. Therefore, order was not further
considered.
Replicating the earlier results, there was a main effect of
moral foundation, F(3.37, 1631.87) ¼ 186.20, p < .001, Zp2 ¼
0.28, with the highest ratings for Purity violations (M ¼ 3.70,
95% CI ¼ [3.63, 3.76]), followed by fairness (M ¼ 3.49, 95%
CI ¼ [3.43, 3.56]), harm (M ¼ 3.45, 95% CI ¼ [3.39, 3.52]),
authority (M¼ 3.26, 95% CI¼ [3.19, 3.33]), and loyalty viola-
tions (M ¼ 2.88, 95% CI ¼ [2.80, 2.96]).
Consistent with the findings from Studies 1 and 2, and as
specified in our preregistration (https://aspredicted.org/blind.
php?x¼2as8ic), worried participants (M ¼ 3.42, SD ¼ .59)
exhibited harsher moral judgments than less-worried partici-
pants (M ¼ 3.30, SD ¼ .52), F(1, 485) ¼ 4.43, p ¼ .036, Zp2
¼ .01 (see Figure 3). There was no Foundation Worry inter-
action, F(3.37,1631.87) ¼ .53, p ¼ .686. Thus, as was the case
for Studies 1 and 2, the specific moral foundation did not
moderate the effect of coronavirus worry on moral judgments.
Political Orientation
To once again test for possible effects of political orientation on
moral judgment between the two groups, a repeated-measures
ANCOVA was performed as before. As with Studies 1 and 2,
political orientation had a significant effect on moral condem-
nation, F(1,484) ¼ 29.50, p < .001. Also replicating the earlier
findings, there was a statistically significant difference between
the worried and less-worried participants for moral disap-
proval, F(1, 484)¼ 5.82, p¼ .016, Zp2¼ .01, such that worried
participants rated moral violations as more objectionable than
less-worried participants. Thus, political orientation was not a
confound.
Figure 3. Ratings of moral condemnation for individuals who were worried, or relatively less worried about coronavirus, Study 3.
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Contamination Disgust
Contamination disgust was associated with COVID-19 worry
(r ¼ .30, p < .001), which is consistent with Studies 1 and 2.
Following the logic of the earlier studies, we investigated the
possible contribution of contamination disgust on moral judg-
ment by performing another analysis that included the contam-
ination subscale of the DS-R as a covariate. This variable was
again significantly related to moral condemnation, F(1, 484) ¼
77.50, p < .001, Zp2¼ .14. In contrast to the earlier two studies,
however there was no longer a significant effect for corona-
virus worry on moral judgment after controlling for the effect
of contamination disgust, F(1, 484) ¼ .005, p ¼ .944, Zp2 ¼
.00, indicating that contamination concerns were largely
responsible for the effect descried above.
Contamination Disgust Over Time
Because the finding that the relationship between worry and
moral judgments was no longer significant after controlling for
contamination disgust, we considered potential reasons for this
unexpected result. One possibility is that contamination scores
increased over time, as people became increasingly familiar
with the coronavirus threat. Indeed, the effect size of the asso-
ciation between contamination disgust and COVID-19 worry
was identical in Studies 1 and 2, but it was larger in Study 3.
We therefore tested whether the participants in May reported
higher contamination disgust relative to the participants tested
in March. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if
contamination disgust scores were different between Studies 1,
2, and 3. There was a main effect of contamination disgust
across the studies, F(2, 910) ¼ 9.63, p < .001, Z2 ¼ .02. Tukey
post hoc tests revealed that contamination disgust in Study 1 (M
¼ 2.63, SD ¼ .78) and Study 2 (M ¼ 2.68, SD ¼ .87) did not
differ, p ¼ .792 (.05, 95% CI [.13, .24]). However, the mean
increase between Study 1 and Study 3 (M ¼ 2.89, SD ¼ .81)
was significant (.26, 95% CI [.10, .42], p < .001), as was the
mean increase between Study 2 and Study 3 (.21, 95% CI [.05,
.37], p ¼ .004). Thus, while there was no significant increase
between the March 17 and March 27 groups, there was a sig-
nificant rise in contamination disgust between the March
groups and the May 6 group, suggesting that as the pandemic
wore on, people may have become more sensitive to contam-
ination, and that this concern therefore overshadowed the con-
tribution of coronavirus worry alone.
Discussion
This preregistered study largely replicated the findings from
Studies 1 and 2. What is noteworthy, however, is that the
magnitude of the effect was somewhat smaller. One possibility
is the fact that the sample was more diverse in many respects,
given that it came from all across the U.S. In addition, it might
have also mattered that nearly 2 months had passed since the
outbreak of the pandemic, with many areas having issued stay-
at-home orders by that point. Indeed, inspecting the means
revealed that, while moral judgments among worried partici-
pants were practically identical across the three studies (Study
1: M ¼ 3.42; Study 2: M¼ 3.43; Study 3: M¼ 3.43), the moral
judgments for less worried participants were higher in Study 3
(M¼ 3.30) than in Study 1 (M¼ 3.18) and Study 2 (M¼ 3.18).
An exploratory ANOVA comparing this group in March vs.
May found a marginally significant effect, F(1, 272) ¼ 3.42,
p ¼ .066, d ¼ .22, such that participants in May who were
relatively less worried about the disease produced harsher
moral judgments than participants less worried about the dis-
ease in March, perhaps as a function of extended exposure to
this threat. Lastly, we found that the association between worry
and moral condemnation was no longer significant when con-
trolling for contamination disgust, indicating that the fear of
pathogens was largely responsible for the effect of COVID-19
worry on moral condemnation.
Internal Meta-Analysis
Since the methods were largely the same across the three stud-
ies, we combined the data sets (N ¼ 913) to conduct a mini
meta-analysis, following the recent best-practices recommen-
dations of a number of researchers and statisticians (e.g., Goh
et al., 2016; Lakens & Etz, 2017; McShane & Böckenholt,
2017). Based on the guidelines proposed by Goh et al.
(2016), we used fixed effects in which the effect sizes within
each study and the mean effect sizes across the three studies
were weighted by sample size. We first converted Cohen’s
d effect sizes (Study 1: d ¼ .47, Study 2: d ¼ .42, Study 3:
d ¼ .24) into Pearson’s r for ease of analysis. All effect sizes
were then Fisher’s z transformed for analyses and converted
back to Pearson’s r for presentation. Overall, the effect was
significant, Mr ¼ .15, Z ¼ 4.81, p < .001, two-tailed, such that
individuals worried about COVID-19 rated moral violations as
more objectionable than those who were less worried. A fully
random effects test of the overall effect was also significant, as
indicated by a one-sample t-test of the mean effect size against
zero, Mr ¼ .17, t(2) ¼ 4.67, p ¼ .043, two-tailed.
Although all three studies showed no moderating role of
foundation type, we nevertheless considered it instructive to
explore such potential differences, given the research interest
that the question of specificity to moral domain has received.
Purity (Mr ¼ .16, p < .001) showed the strongest effect, which
makes sense given that COVID-19 poses a direct threat to one’s
physical health. Significant effects, however, also occurred for
Harm (Mr ¼ .13, p < .001), Fairness (Mr ¼ .12, p < .001)
Authority (Mr ¼ .11, p < .001) and Loyalty (Mr ¼ .11,
p < .001), suggesting that the effect was relatively broad. A
fully random effects test of the effects against zero yielded
significant results for three of the five moral foundations as
indicated by one-sample t-tests against zero (all two-tailed).
The strongest effect was for Purity, Mr ¼ .18, t(2) ¼ 5.13,
p ¼ .036, followed by Harm, M r ¼ .14, t(2) ¼ 11.94,
p ¼ .01 and Authority, Mr ¼ .12, t(2) ¼ 4.52, p ¼ .046. The
remaining two foundations, Fairness, M r ¼ .15, t(2) ¼ 3.38,
p¼ .077, and Loyalty, M r¼ .13, t(2)¼ 3.28, p¼ .081, reached
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marginal significance. Thus, the meta-analysis revealed a
small-to-medium sized effect (Funder & Ozer, 2019) of worry
about the coronavirus on moral condemnation across different
content domains.
General Discussion
This research tested the role of situational concerns about an
infectious disease on judgments of wrongdoing. Across three
studies we consistently found that people who were worried
about COVID-19 condemned moral wrongdoers more harshly
than those who were less worried. This finding adds to emer-
ging work on the role of disease threat on moral judgment. In
Studies 1 and 2 controlling for individual differences in con-
tamination disgust left the effect of coronavirus worry and
moral judgment intact. In contrast, in Study 3, we found that
this relationship was no longer significant after accounting for
contamination disgust, indicating that fear of contamination
was responsible for the effect. We interpret this finding to be
the result of a generally heightened concern about the virus at
the time. Indeed, contamination disgust has been described as
bearing a “striking similarity” to disease avoidance (Olatunji
et al., 2009). An intriguing possibility is, therefore, that vari-
ables that are typically considered to reflect stable individual
differences, such as disgust sensitivity, may change as a func-
tion of coronavirus concerns that became relatively universal
across the world. Indeed, recent theorizing has suggested that
topics within the field of of psychology, and the scientific
approaches to study them, may change in the wake of the
COVID-19 pandemic (Rosenfeld et al., in press). Given the
current findings, apart from contamination and disease con-
cerns, other relevant traits such as neuroticism or conscien-
tiousness may also have changed over the course of the
pandemic as a function of constantly having been engaged in
disease-prevention behavior to alleviate related worries. Future
research would be needed to explore this possibility.
Our findings align with a growing body of research demon-
strating that individual differences in the propensity to experi-
ence disgust are linked to moral considerations (Chapman &
Anderson, 2014; Karinen & Chapman, 2019; Liuzza et al.,
2019; Murray et al., 2019; Robinson et al., 2019; Wagemans
et al., 2018). Furthermore, the results are consistent with recent
work showing a positive association between germ aversion
and moral condemnation across the moral foundations (Murray
et al., 2019). Our findings contribute to this line of research by
demonstrating that subjective worry about a real-world conta-
gious disease is associated with harsher moral judgments, and,
moreover, that this relationship held even after accounting for
differences in political orientation. Thus, converging evidence
supports Haidt’s (2001) suggestion that morality is shaped by
various emotions and intuitions, of which concerns about
health and safety are prominent.
There are limitations within these findings. Though we
obtained large samples with consistent results across all three
studies, we used a single item to measure “worry,” which may
have reduced sensitivity in capturing participants’ level of
concern about COVID-19. Another qualification to these
results is the difference in the relationships between the trait-
like measures of COVID-19 worry and moral judgments, and
the effects of the experimental manipulation in Study 1. That is,
although dispositional worry about contracting the illness was
consistently related to moral condemnation, experimentally
manipulating the salience of COVID-19 had no effect on moral
judgment, relative to a neutral condition. One possibility for
why is by the time of Study 1 on March 17, news about
COVID-19 was already highly salient, and thus the experimen-
tal manipulation did not have the intended effect. The disposi-
tional association, however, might be explained by a
generalized overreaction to potential harm. It is possible that
those who are prone to chronic worry about contracting an
infectious illness are also more sensitive to moral violations
in disease-relevant domains as well as other moral infractions.
That is, fear of disease may overlap with an overgeneralized
reaction of increased sensitivity to potential harm, including
moral wrongdoers who commit not only purity violations, but
other unfavorable acts as well. Indeed, worried participants
produced harsher judgments than less worried participants, and
there was no moderating effect of moral foundation. This is
consistent with previous research, indicating that disease threat
concerns are associated with conformity to moral proscriptions
that are not specific to disease (e.g., Murray et al., 2011; Tybur
et al., 2016; Wu & Chang, 2012). Lack of moderation by foun-
dation type is likewise consistent with error management, such
that the more costly error is to be under-vigilant about moral
violations that are not disease relevant than to be over-vigilant
solely for disease-relevant violations (Haselton et al., 2015;
Murray et al., 2019). Further research is needed to more care-
fully explore these dispositional versus experimental
differences.
Additionally, we did not test whether other variables, such
as personality, might have played a role in our results. Disease
avoidance has been associated with both neuroticism and con-
scientiousness (Oosterhoff et al., 2018), while openness, con-
scientiousness, and agreeableness have been associated with
sensitivity to moral violations (Hirsh et al., 2010; Smillie
et al., 2020). Thus, considering the overlap between disease
avoidance, moral judgments, and conscientiousness, this per-
sonality trait may account for some of the variance between
worry about a highly salient communicable disease and assess-
ments of moral wrongdoing.
Our research raises the possibility that during a period of
widespread concern about infectious disease, people may
become more judgmental overall. In other words, people’s
actions and intentions might be under more scrutiny, and when
ambiguous, may be interpreted uncharitably, potentially result-
ing in misunderstandings, or interpersonal conflicts. Indeed, in
the early days of the unfolding COVID-19 crisis, there were
media accounts of mistrust in public officials, the press, and
health organizations. The current findings suggest that we may
see further instances of uncharitable evaluations as people are
especially concerned for their physical health. Thus, the
ongoing pandemic presented an ecologically relevant way of
8 Evolutionary Psychology
examining the role of disease prevalence on an issue of critical
applied importance.
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